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Manuel F. Cohent
Professor Cary has written a very good book. Full disclosure compels
me to admit my bias in this judgment, for I was privileged to be a
member of the Securities and Exchange Commission while Bill Cary
was its chairman. Nevertheless, I can still recommend the book with
some objectivity to anyone interested in the realities of the administrative process.'
The book is Professor Cary's answer to the important question of
how a regulatory agency can retain or regenerate the creativity and
momentum which are usually present in the early years of its existence.
While drawn largely from his experience at the SEC, the book reflects
his observation of the methods and problems of other regulatory
agencies. 2 In his view, a satisfactory answer to the question demands
an analysis of the realities of the political world within which an agency
operates, and, most specifically, of the various checks which are placed
upon an agency's freedom of action. To provide this analysis the book
explores the complex relationships among an agency, the White House,
and the Congress.
Gary is uneasy in his discussions of pressures and controls which he
is persuaded the White House can exert over an agency. He believes
that the President has a general interest in an agency's work, but
becomes directly involved only when this work is not being done well.
Because Cary's experience was marked by a lack of direct presidential
involvement in the problems of the SEC, he believes that White House
aides are often in a position to exert pressure to further their own aims
and ambitions, and he cautions against over-involvement with these
t Manuel F. Cohen is Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The author
gratefully acknowledges the work done in the preparation of this review by his legal

assistant, Jeffrey D. Bauman.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility
for any private publication by any of its members or employees. Therefore, the views
expressed here are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or its staff.
I The book is based on the Cooley Lectures which Professor Cary delivered at the
University of Michigan in February, 1966.
2 Professor Cary limits his discussion to the problems of the CAB, FCC, FTC, FPC, ICC,
and SEC. He excludes the NLRB because its organizational structure is basically different

from that of the six other independent regulatory agencies.
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aides. Gary suggests that despite the lack of overt presidential interest
in specific programs and policies, there are formal and informal controls
which may materially affect an agency's initiative, willingness, and
capacity to seek imaginative solutions to new problems. In his view,
the formal power of appointment of agency members; an informal
clearance of certain high-level appointments within an agency; the
participation in fixing an agency's budget; and the control, through
the Civil Service Commission, of the allocation of the "supergrades"
of an agency's personnel-all operate continuously and, when improperly used, can severely hamper an agency.
Cary believes, however, that agencies should and do enjoy a considerable measure of independence from the White House in determining
policy. He argues that an agency should not be subject to any pressure
when engaged in adjudication. In other matters, he believes that an
agency should inform the White House of significant actions it intends
to take, but that it should not seek prior approval of such actions and
should reject White House suggestions which are without merit. He
recognizes that this last argument contains the seeds of potential
conflict between an agency and the White House, for he believes that
the President, in formulating national economic policy, should ultimately be able to compel an agency to reverse a decision which is
contrary to that policy, even if the agency chairman is forced to resign
because of the conflict.
I agree with much of the analysis of the facts of agency life, but in
many respects Gary's experience differs from mine. I do not share
Cary's mistrust of White House aides. Nor have I encountered any
pressure. Indeed I have been accorded every opportunity to explain
the SEC's problems and policies in depth and to seek White House aid
in the fulfillment of significant programs, particularly those of a legislative character. No significant conflict, potential or otherwise, has
arisen between the judgments of my agency and of the White House. I
agree with Professor Gary's suggestion that the resolution of such questions as may arise involves a complex balancing process which depends
as much upon the personalities involved as upon the issues. In addition,
any agency's relationship with the White House depends upon many
other, and perhaps more important factors-not the least of which
are the activities (or lack thereof) of the agency at a particular time,
and the effect of these activities upon broad national policies. In
articulating his thesis, Cary suggests that, during the New Deal, agency
chairmen often had direct contact with President Roosevelt, partly
because he desired it and partly because the work of the agencies was so
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vital to major problems facing the nation. Other presidents have
neither welcomed nor encouraged such contact. A close relationship
may also develop because the President is interested in specific legislation or existing programs of an agency. Frequently this interest arises
because of the ability of the agency chairman, working through the
White House staff, to make clear the importance of agency problems
or proposals. To an agency seeking legislation, the initial interest and
ultimate support of the President is of the utmost importance. The
initial interest may result in the legislation receiving mention in a
Presidential message; the ultimate support may be necessary when the
bill is to be acted upon. The interest and support do not occur by
accident; to obtain them, as Cary recognizes, may plunge the agency
chairman into the midst of a thicket.
Cary is more comfortable in his analysis of congressional checks on
an agency. Although he does not directly say so, it is clear that he
considers these to be more significant and more likely to affect an
agency's performance than White House interest. This belief stems to
a large degree from a disappointment which he experienced shortly
after becoming Chairman-the rejection of a Legislative Reorganization Plan for the SEC. The lessons that episode provided deeply
influenced his subsequent relationship with Congress-a relationship
which was substantial and extremely effective. He was instrumental
in the initiation of the Special Study of the Securities Markets and he
guided the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, 4 which implemented
many of the Study's recommendations, through Congress. It is small
wonder that he concludes that an agency chairman must spend a great
deal of his time on Capitol Hill.
Cary believes that Congress properly exercises active supervision over
the agencies it created to give substance to broad legislative policies.
Congress jealously guards its supervisory role and resists efforts of the
White House and the agencies themselves to erode it. Indeed, Cary
suggests that, in 1961, Congress refused to enact reorganization plans
for some agencies because the White House had not consulted it prior
to introducing the plans, rather than because Congress disagreed with
their merits.
He points out that one form of congressional supervision or control
is the annual review of an agency's budget by the Appropriations Com3

SEC, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND

EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) [hereinafter cited
35 SPECIAL STUDY].
4 Act of August 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565.
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mittee in the House and in the Senate. Gary believes that this review
is necessary and proper, but questions appropriations committee directions to an agency on how it should spend appropriated funds.5
The author attaches greater significance to the control lodged in the
committees with jurisdiction over the substantive work of the agency.
This is generally manifested through broad oversight of the work of
the agency. Occasionally, however, a committee may exercise it by
involvement in the merits of substantive matters with which the agency
is concerned. Such involvement can lead to conflict, and in his view,
it may raise serious questions about the nature and extent of an
agency's independence and its proper relationship to Congress.
Gary does not attempt to establish fixed rules for determining the
propriety of congressional involvement. Rather, he chooses several
recent examples and comments on the propriety of each. He divides
congressional action into three broad categories. The first is reversal by
the entire Congress of a specific agency rule or decision (for example,
the FTC's trade regulation rule governing the labeling of cigarettes).6
He believes that Congress (rather than a single committee), which
enacted the statute administered by the agency, has the right to determine whether to revise specific agency actions or interpretations. When
an adverse expression is solely that of a committee and no legislation
is enacted (his second category), Gary questions the propriety of the
action (he cites the committee's interest and views concerning the
FCC's treatment of subscription television). He believes that such
committee action may result from undue pressure by an industry or
by a powerful constituent of a single congressman. He suggests that
such action can paralyze the agency with serious effect on its performance and that the public interest may not be adequately protected.
The third category, in which he believes congressional action is clearly
improper, includes congressional attempts to affect matters which are
under agency adjudication. These may take the form of an ex parte
communication from a congressman to an agency member or the
initiation of congressional hearings during the pendency of an adjudicatory proceedings.

7

There is little doubt that congressional oversight can be valuable to
5 Gary cites, as an example, the direction to the Federal Power Commission not to
investigate the need for bringing REA cooperatives within that Commission's jurisdiction
6 29 Fed. Reg. 8324 (1964).
7 In Pillsbury v. FTC, 854 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966), the court held that procedural due
process was violated by the detailed responses of some commissioners to a Senate committee concerning their mental processes regarding a pending case. Before the initiation
of this litigation, Chairman Howrey had disqualified himself from further participation
in the agency proceeding because of his appearance before the committee.
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Congress and to the agency. An agency which avails itself fully of the
advice and assistance of a committee and of its staff frequently receives
constructive suggestions. Staff members of a committee, who are usually
as overworked as the members of the Congress, are often overlooked
in analyses of the relationship between agencies and Congress but, as
any agency chairman can testify, an understanding of their role is
essential to an understanding of the realities of agency life. The SEC
has been fortunate in these relationships. With the active assistance of
their staffs, these committees have supported proposed Commission
studies, have assisted in the development of legislation, have been helpful in the Commission's daily regulatory work, and have been sympathetic to its needs for personnel and other resources. It is as essential
for an agency to have good working relationships with committee staffs
as it is to have such relationships with the White House staff, and for
similar reasons. These relationships do not develop accidentally, and
an agency chairman must devote considerable time and effort to maintaining and strengthening them.
In analyzing the controls which both the White House and the
Congress can exert over an agency, Cary is really concerned with the
nature of the independence of a regulatory agency, The need to maintain an agency's "independence" is often asserted, but seldom is the
word carefully defined. Independence does not mean that agencies can
do whatever they please, free from checks by other branches of the
government.8 Agencies are the creatures of the legislature, which can
properly condition the exercise of the powers it has delegated. Nor does
independence mean that agencies are or should be removed from
political pressures-using "political" in the broadest sense. A Congress
authorized to enact laws and a President charged with executing them
or having related responsibilities will have strong views on how those
laws are administered, and ought not refrain from making those views
known. What independence does mean, I think, is the authority and
practical ability of agencies to make decisions free of interference (or,
at the least, improper interference), even if those decisions are ultimately reversed by courts, legislatures, or the President.
The definition of what constitutes improper pressures of interference
is, not surprisingly, a subjective one, depending on whether the one
making it sits in the White House, on Capitol Hill, or in the agency
offices. To complicate matters further, the realities of life do not always
permit decisions to be made solely on the basis of theoretical analyses.
Cary is concerned that the checks which Congress and the White
8 Compare Chairman Martin's statement that the Federal Reserve Board is independent
"within the Government, not of it." Wall Street Journal, May 5, 1967, at 1, col. 1.
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House place upon an agency, even when properly applied, can reduce
the agency's ability to act creatively. He also refers to three factors
within the structure and operation of an agency which can accentuate
the problem of a lack of creativity. One of these is the desire for a
"balanced" commission, i.e., one whose members reflect the points of
view of everyone affected by the agency, including the general public.
Another, present in every agency to some degree, is the tendency to
over-judicialize the decision-making process. As many scholars have
pointed out, this tendency, which has been accentuated by the Administrative Procedure Act, 9 is contrary to the traditional concept of an
administrative agency-a body with the expertise to solve problems
for which judicial procedures are not ideally suited and with an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the available tools.10 There
is also the claim, easily made, but at best only superficially true, that
an agency is the captive of the industry it regulates. To the extent that
an agency is burdened with an image of captivity, it has difficulty in
recruiting and keeping a good staff, attracting able commissioners, and
convincing the public and Congress of the value of its activities. This
is a perceptive analysis. Every agency needs balance, but an overemphasis on balance may lead to delays in filling vacancies and may
severely handicap an agency's efficiency. The tendency to over-judicialization, which Cary rightly criticizes, is an even greater obstacle,
for it undermines an agency's ability to utilize every available technique in determining policy-adjudication, rule making, policy statements, and a variety of informal procedures.
The importance of flexibility in making policy cannot be emphasized
too strongly. There are many groups whose different interests may be
affected by decisions of any agency. Often the agency's task is to
reconcile and resolve the conflicts among them. In so doing, the agency
often affords the only effective protections for the interests of those who
lack representation elsewhere-whether they are small businessmen,
union members, manufacturers, or public investors. In making decisions, whether or not they involve the reconciliation of competing
demands, it is essential for an agency to formulate and articulate meaningful standards which will be consistently applied by the agency and
its staff, so that those whom the agency regulates will be able to order
their conduct with a fair degree of knowledge of the potential consequences. As Judge Friendly has pointed out, the pressures on agency
9 60 Stat. 273 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1958).
10 J. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (1960) (also in
pamphlet form as a committee print of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 86th Cong. 2d

Sess. (1960)).
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members which have been so widely publicized have arisen, at least in
the past, from the belief that there were no standards, or that standards
were not being applied consistently. One reason for having more
definite standards is to preserve the independence which an agency
so highly prizes."1
The wide variety of problems facing an agency makes pointless
arguments whether adjudication or rule making provides a better
technique for making policy. Each is useful and each is clearly important. And they are not the only techniques available. I cannot agree
with a popular view that rule making should be used almost to the
complete exclusion of adjudication. 2 1 am persuaded that the emphasis
given to this view by some reflects a concern that the timid use of rule
making, and the narrow bases on which adjudicated cases are decided,
have impeded development and articulation of policy. Writing for the
SEC, I must emphasize that it has used adjudication very successfully
in establishing standards for those subject to its jurisdiction, frequently
in situations which would have made rule making improbable if not
impossible. In Cady, Roberts & Co.,'3 for example, the Commission
established the important standard that those privy to privileged
information must refrain from using it before the investing public is
fairly informed. Subsequent litigation and administrative actions have
expanded and clarified this standard. As Judge Friendly has indicated,
in approving the Commission's Cady, Roberts decision, if the Commission wished to adopt rules dealing with this subject, it could do so
more effectively after it had considered many more fact situations in
adjudicatory proceedings, and after it had considered the possible
variations and consequences which those additional cases would bring
to light.'4
A bit of Commission history will illustrate the problems flowing
from reliance on rules alone. In the early 1960's the Commission was
faced with a proliferation of situations involving the use of high
11 H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 104 (1967). This is an excellent collection of writings by
one of the country's most knowledgeable observers of the administrative process.
12 See, e.g., Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development
of Administrative Policy, 78 HARv. L. Rlv. 921 (1965); Elman, Rulemaking Procedures
in the FTC's Enforcement of the Merger Law, 78 HARV. L. REv. 385 (1964). The excellent
FTC trade regulation on cigarette labeling, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324 (1964), is an example of an
agency's discussion of the issue. I have elsewhere discussed this controversy in the context
of an important area of the work of the Securities and Exchange Commission. See Cohen
& Rabin, Broker-Dealer Selling Practice Standards: The Importance of Administrative
Adjudication in Their Development, 29 LAw & CoNrEmp. PROB. 691 (1964).
'3

40 S.E.C. 907 (1965).

14 H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS. 146 (1967). See also Conference on Codification of the
FederalSecurities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793, 900-01 (1967).
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pressure techniques by securities dealers to sell speculative securities,
usually to relatively unsophisticated customers. In addition to instituting administrative proceedings and injunctive actions in the courts,
the Commission published for public comment a so-called "boiler
room" rule which would have defined specified conduct as being
violative of the antifraud mandates of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.15 The Commission felt that this rule would serve several purposes; it would articulate the Commission's views and, perhaps, make
enforcement more effective. The comments which the Commission
received reflected the tremendous ingenuity and imagination of the
Bar. Numerous situations clearly not within the Commission's contemplation, but conceivably within the literal provisions of the proposed rule, were brought to the Commission's attention. After a number
of attempts to meet these objections, the Commission withdrew the
proposed rule, and articulated meaningful standards which dealt with
the problems in its opinions in a number of hotly contested adjudicatory proceedings. 1 6 The important point here, of course, is that the
Commission found it impossible in a real sense to define a species of
fraud in a manner which would specify the full range of improper
conduct without encompassing other activities not intended to be
reached.
On the other hand, rule making is often the best way for an agency
to marshal the facts and relevant policy considerations and to develop
standards to govern the conduct sought to be regulated. Rule making
affords the agency the opportunity to hear the views of many interested
persons who could not participate in particular adjudicatory proceedings. 17 Rule making may also provide a better way for the agency to
plan the development of policy. Adjudication inevitably takes time,
and the record which comes to the agency for decision may be incomplete or may provide a narrow ground for decision which would lessen
the need or discourage the attempt to articulate in the opinion
15 Proposed Rule 15c2 -6 , Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 6885 (August 16, 1902).
See Note, A Symptomatic Approach to Securities Fraud: The SEC's proposed Rule 15c2-6
and the Boiler Room, 72 YAL.E LJ. 1411 (1963).
16 See, e.g., Mac Robbins & Co., Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 6646 (July 11, 1962),
aff'd suO nom. Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963). It is possible for a doctrine to be
too successfully established. After Mac Robins, respondents argued that their misrepresentations in selling speculative securities were less serious if they were not made in

connection with the operation of a
answer, see Huntington Securities
(June 2, 1967).
17 The amicus curiae brief, which
is generally not as effective a device
determination.

boiler room than if they were. For the Commission's
Co., Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 8090 at 4
an agency could accept in an adjudicatory proceeding,
for obtaining a wide range of views so necessary to a
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standards not necessary for decision in the case but important to a
fuller statement of related principles. It is often true that the questions
suggested by a particular case may be much broader than the simple
facts of the case. There is also the view that it may be as unwise as it
is difficult for the agency to establish meaningful standards through
dicta inappropriate to the disposition of the case.
I must stress that the choice between adjudication and rule making
is not the choice between making inconsistent ad hoc decisions and
formulating comprehensive standards. An agency should not, and
normally does not, bring cases indiscriminately. It can and does utilize
its power to institute proceedings with sufficient care to assure that
cases which raise important policy questions come before it. And every
agency attempts to be consistent in its decisions, an effort usually
assisted by vigorous counsel. This results in a body of case law from
which meaningful standards can be distilled readily.
While stressing the positive uses of adjudication, I should point out
that the Commission has used rule making to a considerable extent as
a tool in formulating policy. Our rule books are thick-in the view of
some, too thick. The Commission has issued statements of policy or
interpretation and has published memoranda of the administrative
practices, indulged in by it and by its staff, all of which provide guidelines for those subject to the rules and related procedures of the Commission. One recent example concerned the Commission's net capital
rule,' 8 the rule which specifies the amount of capital required of
broker-dealer firms to enter and remain in the securities business. To
clarify problems which had arisen under the rule (which occupies one
page), the Commission issued a release (of 29 pages) explaining precisely (and with examples) for the benefit of the layman subject to the
rule, as well as his lawyer, how the rule operates in a variety of situations.19
Still another important technique, which Cary mentions in connection with enactment of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964 but
which has wider application, is the use of informal discussions with
interested persons before the adoption of rules or forms. When proposals are very complex or of far reaching effect and importance, I
believe the Commission proposes better rules, with which both it and
those subject to the rules can live happily, when it discusses these
proposals with representatives of business and professional groups
before they are formally published for general comment. In some
cases, these discussions have led a self-regulatory body to take action,
18 17 C.F.R. 240.15c3-1 (1962).
19 Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 8024 (January 16, 1967).
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thus obviating the need for Commission action. In other cases, they
resulted in the abandonment of a proposal or development of a rule
or form which was quickly accepted and adopted. This technique
permits prompt remedial action, so that the agency can devote its
energy and the talents of its limited staff to a wider band of urgent
problems.
The Special Study of the Securities Markets, authorized by Congress
in 1961 and transmitted to Congress two years later, provides the
vehicle which ties together many of Cary's ideas. His analysis does not
provide a blueprint for every agency, but there are lessons in it for all.
He points out that in 1961, the SEC was not hampered by some of the
problems discussed. No claim of captivity could be raised against the
Commission. There was no problem of balance; the distinction between
pro-consumer and pro-industry commissioners had never been meaningfully applied to the SEC. There was also a long tradition of staff
competence at the Commission. Of equal importance, however, is the
fact that a principal function of the Commission is to maintain or
elevate high standards in the securities industry rather than to grant
licenses or to resolve conipeting demands for economic benefits.
The discussion of the initiation and conduct of the Special Study
is instructive. It was recognized that the structure and functioning of
the securities markets had undergone dramatic changes which presented
problems meriting serious study. These might, in turn, require farreaching solutions. The Commission never considered the Study a
means for mounting an attack on the securities industry. Such an
approach would have been highly irresponsible and might have
provoked a needless unsettling of sensitive markets. Further, the Commission believed that it would need some industry support for any
major legislation it might recommend, support which would not have
been forthcoming had the entire industry viewed the Study and consequent recommendations as such an attack. 20 The Commission decided
that the most responsible approach would be a careful, comprehensive,
well-documented study of the securities industry, conducted by an
independent group within the Commission which would be led by
someone outside the Commission and aided by outside consultants.
The Commission hoped that such a study would encourage, where
reasonably feasible, the self-regulatory bodies subject to the Commission's oversight to undertake their own reforms.
Perhaps the most fascinating part of the book is that devoted to the
20 Too much discussion and argument may create its own problems. During the
hearings on the bill which was ultimately introduced, some Congressmen were suspicious
of the bill because there was not enough opposition.
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development and passage of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964.
Gary traces the bill from its drafting stage through final passage, carefully describing many of the hazards it faced. He points out that, since
the bill was not sponsored by the Administration, the first problem
facing the agency was the preparation of a bill of such popular appeal
that the Committee Chairmen would hold hearings on it. The Special
Study did generate such interest and the Commission was able to
surmount this first hurdle. Although the SEC had unsuccessfully
sought enactment of significant parts of the bill for many years, the bill
as introduced was considered to be noncontroversial. Nevertheless, it
encountered difficulties at every stage. Committee reports, floor debates,
conversations in halls, conferences in congressmen's offices, final negotiations and concessions-all are set out and all are reflections of the
fascinating and sometimes frustrating paths and detours which are
encountered in the enactment of important legislation. I remember
the relief when the bill passed without the need for conference; that
moment and all of the emotions and excitement surrounding the path
of the bill are perceptively captured here. The bill was the culmination
of Cary's chairmanship and, although he does not claim credit for its
passage, it would not have been realized without his skillful leadership.
In the final part of the book, Cary moves to an issue of continuing
interest to scholars of the administrative process. In doing so, he takes
issue with two former chairmen (of other agencies) on how to improve
the administrative process. Louis Hector, former Chairman of the
CAB, and Newton Minow, former head of the FCC, had criticized the
performance of these regulatory agencies. 21 They contended that the
agencies had failed to develop clearly articluated policies and standards,
and had performed their judicial functions poorly because of a lack
of time and staff, and because of the combination in one agency of
prosecutory and adjudicatory functions. They also argued that the
country's economy suffers under the present regulatory structure
because there is inadequate coordination of policy among related
agencies. To cure these problems, they would transfer the agencies'
judicial functions to an administrative court or series of courts, and
would have agency policy determined by a single executive who would
be appointed by and be responsible to the President.
Cary agrees with their broad objectives--greater efficiency and better
policy development-but he suggests different means for achieving
21 Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69
YAiz L.J. 931 (1960); Letter from Newton N. Minnow to the President of the United States,
May 31, 1963 (available from the Federal Communications Commission).
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these objectives. His experience leads him to conclude that good
management requires that the authority to plan and the responsibility
to execute and enforce be centralized in the same hands.2 2 He feels
strongly that the interaction of various policy-making techniques
assists the agency in formulating meaningful policy. Unlike Hector
and Minow, Gary believes that adjudication is a useful policy-making
tool, and with this I concur,23 as I do with all of Gary's views in this
area.
Cary also suggests, correctly, that although a Commission does have
the potential to concentrate primarily on policy determinations, this
potential is substantially diluted when the Commission consists of too
large a number of members. I sympathize with the frustrations which
Hector and Minow experienced; every chairman, indeed every member,
of a commission feels, at times, that the agency is not performing well
and has lost sight of its goals. The cure for such frustration is not,
however punishment of the agency-and thus of the public and the
affected industries-by taking away its policy-making function. This,
Gary reminds us, would lower the quality of administrators and
seriously fragment the regulatory process.
This book is more than an informed essay on how agencies are and
should be operated; it is more than an illuminating description of
how one particular agency did, in fact, operate at a particular time and
place. It is a carefully documented essay demonstrating how an agency
and its chairman, indeed all of its members, are inextricably bound up
in the political process. Agencies must learn how to use the political
process for the benefit of the public interest they were created to
protect. The great virtue of this book is that it provides tools for
analysis and instruction to anyone interested whether he be lawyer,
political scientist congressman, or agency member.
22 Cary, characteristically, points out that his conclusions had been reached earlier by
other scholars; he believes that practical experience supports these conclusions. See 1
K. DAVIs, ADidINISrkATIV LANW § 1.04 (Supp. 1965); Auerbach, Some Thoughts on the Hector
Memorandum, 1960 Wis. L. REv. 183; Auerbachi Should Administrative Agencies Perform
Adjudicatory Functions?, 1959 Wis. L. REY. 95; Friendly, A Look at the FederalAdministrative Agencies, 60 COLUm. L. REv. 429, 441 (1960).
23 See Cohen & kabin, supka note 12, at 691.

